Coercive Sanctions and International Conflicts: A Sociological Theory by Mark Daniel Jaeger

Author:Mark Daniel Jaeger [Jaeger, Mark Daniel]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781315522395
Google: f31aDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 39819780
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-05-11T07:29:43+00:00

Conflict observation after the first wave of negative sanctions

After the presidential elections, the first wave of Chinese sanctions, military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, ended. Conflict observation on the Taiwanese side, however, remained largely unchanged. The ‘new old’ Kuomintang government continued to make reconciliatory statements in keeping with the rhetoric of its recent presidential election campaign, without compromising its position.

Pledges and invitations to resume talks across the Taiwan Strait by government officials were advanced more formally by President-elect Lee in his inaugural address, during which he emphasized dialogue as a path towards conflict resolution and offered “to embark upon a journey of peace to Mainland China […] to meet with the top leadership of the Chinese Communists for a direct exchange of views in order to open up a new era of communication and cooperation between the two sides”.151 Lee mentioned commonalities such as the 5,000 years of Chinese history but insisted on the sovereignty of the Republic of China and vowed to continue with its ‘pragmatic diplomacy’. Accordingly, foreign trips by government officials continued in the following years,152 frequently involving ‘stop-overs’ in the US.153 Also, the campaign to join the UN continued at first,154 albeit at a lower profile.155 Efforts to expand dialogue,156 with the aim of also eventually signing a peace accord at the turn of the millennium157 and of fostering economic exchange158 in a limited and controlled manner were accompanied by calls for caution and restrictions on economic investments on the Mainland159 as part of a ‘no haste, be patient policy’ (Tanner 2007:47f.). The Kuomintang government also announced further restrictions on such investments should the conflict escalate.160 Despite these efforts, Taiwanese investment in China was reportedly continuing to grow unhindered.161 The Lee administration continued to raise its unchanged preconditions,162 while reiterating its commitment to reunification.163 At the same time, the government continued to refer to the division164 in a particular way, as ‘one divided China’, restating its intention to promote the sovereignty of the Republic of China.165 In addition, the Kuomintang government relinquished historical Republic of China claims to Outer Mongolia. Together with constitutional changes that suspended provincial Taiwan and National Assembly (i.e., Taiwan + Mainland) elections, such moves could contribute to interpretations of Taiwan as a separate state.166 The visit to Taiwan of the Dalai Lama, who was called a separatist by conservatives,167 and announcements regarding opening a representative office in Taipei, also potentially furthered this image, despite assurances to the contrary.168

On several points, the DPP’s position on matters related to the Cross-Strait conflict was in considerable accordance with that of the Kuomintang government. DPP politicians vowed to return to dialogue with China169 but demanded that a cross-party consensus be established on the content of the dialogue.170 The DPP assented to the constitutional changes and the revocation of claims to Outer Mongolia.171 DPP member Lu Hsiu-lien even led Taiwan’s official delegation to the UN to make known Taiwan’s wish to return to the organization.172 In addition to such agreements, DPP statements continued to favor independence, with different party factions either more or less in favor.

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